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And For Law: Why Space cannot be understood without Law
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos1
Doreen Massey, the iconic political geographer, whose book For Space has 
influenced the way various disciplines understand space, has largely ignored law 
in her work. In fact, most non-legal scholars replace law with politics. Here, I read 
Massey through law, arguing that often, non-legal writing is characterized by a 
misapprehension of the law. Through an analysis of her arguments against some 
understandings of space (such as systemic, negative, closed, textual), I mount a 
critique against the standard understandings of law (as precisely all these things) 
and suggest instead a lawscaping way of understanding the connection between 
law and space, as well as issues of spatial justice and responsibility.
Keywords: Doreen Massey; law; space; justice; responsibility; lawscape
I. Where is Law? 
Doreen Massey is one of the most important geographers of our time. Her work on politics 
of space, gender, globalization and community has had a profound impact, to the extent 
that Massey is thought to be the principal originator of political geography2 and “the most 
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systematic philosophical geographer” across the ages.3 Her theoretical and applied work 
on the concept and practice of space has been extremely influential in the way space is 
understood, not just by geography but by all disciplines. She has managed to move the 
discourse, from the old conceptions of space as container, essentialized abstraction, or its 
positivist, quantifiable understanding, to an open concept of space that is connected, 
relational, embodied, gendered, processual, contingent, multiple and often paradoxical. 
She has ushered a by-now fully accepted understanding of space in the vocabulary of 
multiple disciplines, including law, opening thus the way for the emergence of a legal 
geography of contingency and connectedness.
Despite her formidable interdisciplinary credentials, Massey has hardly ever dealt 
with the law in her writing. Such an omission becomes even more baffling when one 
brings in Doreen Massey the person: during my friendship with her, the law had often 
emerged in our conversations. Her deep problematizing of the law, her frustrated dealings 
with it, but also her profound mistrust of its potential were all frequent topics of our 
discussion. In her work, however, references to the law are scarce; and then only in terms 
of ‘rights’ or ‘regulation’, or administrative structures of the Greater London Authority 
which broadly fall in some legal category. But to make a meal of this would be 
inconsistent with the general thrust of Massey’s work. Indeed, her whole authorial stance 
is not just indifferent to the law but a move away from law, even anti-law. Law seems to 
be representing everything that Massey cannot accept: abstract, closed, textual, 
hegemonic, orderly, apolitical, and so on.
3
 Arun Saldanha, “Power-Geometry as Philosophy of Space”, in Spatial Politics: Essays 
for Doreen Massey, Featherstone and Painter, eds., (Oxford: Blackwell, 2013), p. 48.
It is hard for us, as legal academics, to understand how law appears to non-legal 
academics, but the above characterizations are not uncommon. There might be good 
reasons for this: legal terminology is less integrated in everyday language than say that 
of geography, psychology or even science, and therefore less familiar; jurisdictions and 
scale, different traditions of Common Law, Roman Law, Indigenous law and so on, 
variances in enforceability and legal qualities (formal/informal, written/oral, state 
law/general normativity, and so on), all contribute to the perceived impermeability. 
Terminology apart though, the law often appears to be irrelevant (abstract, closed, textual, 
hegemonic, orderly, apolitical) when compared to the immediacy of political struggles. It 
seems too slow for the urgency of geopolitical and ecological issues, and too co-opted for 
anti-hegemonic thinking. And it can be summarily replaced by something which is more 
approachable, less prohibiting in terms of language, ostensibly more flexible and 
quotidian: politics. While such a substitution is understandable in view of politics’ all-
permeating rhetoric and presence (‘everything is political’, ‘the private is political’ etc), 
the velocity with which it feeds into media’s need for constant new developments, and its 
implicit inclusion of the law, there is a vast amount of issues missed, marginalized or 
plainly misunderstood when the law is not explicitly dealt with.
This is particularly important for geography: to exclude law when thinking of 
issues of property, boundaries, the distinction between public and private, new hybrid 
spaces of private-public partnerships, territory, conflict, order, geopolitics, and even 
space itself as a whole, is to reduce them to versions of political issues that take place in 
space, but whose conceptualization, determination, justification, duration and 
enforcement remain devoid of a convincing explanation. This is not just a question of 
origin: there is little doubt that law is involved in the imposition of boundaries, and that 
subsequently boundaries are enforced by law.4 But the determining influence of law 
extends beyond an originary act. It permeates every single iteration of geographical 
phenomena, reinforcing them, modifying them or annulling them, helping geographers 
(and others) explain the world. 
Naturally, some disciplines are more open to the law than others. International 
relations, policy studies, business administration, amongst others, routinely include legal 
analyses. Similarly, some takes on law have crossed existing disciplinary boundaries with 
relative ease. Law in action, for example, offers a much more palatable version of the law 
as instrument of social transformation, and has been introduced in international relations, 
history, and policy studies, amongst others.5 The broad umbrella of sociolegal studies 
enjoy wide acceptance when it comes to politics, sociology, economics and so on. This 
does not mitigate the fact, though, that the law is not as pivotal for other disciplines as, 
say, politics or economics. Non-legal scholars working on law are still a rarity, especially 
when it comes to its more theoretical perspectives. This is perhaps the reason for which 
legal geography, however successful in creating new ways of thinking about the law, is 
not as widely studied as, say, law and economics. Law’s empirical aspect is often 
integrated in other disciplines as regulation; law’s theoretical aspect, however, remains 
largely unknown outside legal scholarship. Legal geography has always been aware of 
4
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the need to bring in the theoretical,6 and this has complicated its reception even further. 
In that sense, it too has failed to address law’s impression of inaccessibility. 
My goal in this text is double: first, to address the need for an ‘exportable’ 
understanding of the law, namely a law that is neither weighed down by the 
terminological freight of empirical application, nor clouded by excessive theorization 
(whether positivist or critical) that cannot be understood outside the law. In order to do 
this, I address some of the misconceptions of what the law is, and in their stead I offer a 
grounded way of understanding the law. To do this, however, I need the concept of 
geographical space, and for this reason I focus on the discipline of geography, and 
specifically its most sustained inquiry into space, namely Massey’s 2005 book For Space. 
The claim I am making here is that law is entrenched in everything that takes place in 
6
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geographical space (to wit, everything), and that a recourse solely to politics instead of 
also law, deprives geography of indispensable insights in the phenomena at hand in 
relation to both their origin and evolution. I attempt to think of Massey’s space, and this 
is the second aim of this article, in parallel to law, thus adding the jurisprudential 
dimension to Massey’s analysis.7 This is relevant for both legal scholars and geographers, 
as well as for those in the transdisciplinary space of various other disciplines: law can 
open up Massey’s grounded thought on space to considerations of legality, while 
geography can see law as approachable, and indeed no longer inscrutable.
II. For Space, Against Law
Massey looks at space from both an abstract, philosophical perspective and as an 
empirical action field. She understands it in both its universality and its particularity, 
although she is quick to reject the former, and replace it with an understanding of 
connectivity that radiates everywhere. Space for Massey, and perhaps for geography as a 
7
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Kindon, ‘Working with Doreen Downunder: Antipodean Trajectories’, in Spatial 
Politics: Essays for Doreen Massey, David Featherstone and Joe Painter, eds. (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2013) on indigenous law and Massey.
whole, is what law is for legal scholars: elusive, paradoxical, multiple, and always 
running the risk of becoming essentialized and thus misunderstood. Yet law’s 
melancholic lawyer8 is replaced by Massey’s considerably more upbeat political 
geographer. Massey embarks upon a philosophical journey of constructive critique, 
starting from structuralism and representation, moving on to deconstruction, to Laclau 
and Mouffe, and finally Bergson and what is broadly understood as Deleuzian thought. 
She does this with a strong emphasis on gendered and grounded thinking, and concludes 
with her by now deeply influential formulation of space as the product of interrelations; 
as the sphere of the possibility of the existence of multiplicity; and as a process, always 
under construction.9 As we shall see, this definition provides ample space for including 
legal narratives in the definition of space.10
Massey critiques the ways in which space has been theorized in the literature 
(especially space as container, representation, subsumed to time or textual narratives), 
offering in their place a materially grounded yet theoretically adventurous understanding 
of space. Her definition eschews essentialization while at the same time attempts to be 
all-informing and flexible. What is remarkable for my purposes, however, is that these 
criticisms are similar to the ones launched against what is called ‘positivist’, ‘doctrinal’, 
‘black-letter’ law – namely, the way most of us imagine the law before really dealing with 
it. This law is often seen as an inflexible text that commands and controls, in close 
8
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 Doreen Massey, For Space (London: Sage, 2005), p. 9ff. Subsequently Massey, For 
Space.
10
 see e.g. Marianne Constable, Our Word is Our Bond: How Legal Speech Acts (Stanford 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).
connection to a historical understanding of time (in the form of tradition, inherited 
structures, and legal precedent), and barricaded behind an impermeable legal language. I 
would like to explore these commonalities between space and law as objects of critique, 
and draw some parallels between Massey’s critique and the law.
The main reason for which Massey criticizes and partly rejects ideas of space as 
representation is because “over and over we tame the spatial into the textual and the 
conceptual; into representation”.11 Taming space is a recurrent theme in Massey’s work 
and one that causes her palpable irritation because it mutes what space is really about. 
Taming space causes “the suppression of what [space] presents us with: actually existing 
multiplicity”.12 Taming space is regularly done through a textuality that reduces the 
multiplicity of narratives (a defining characteristic of space for Massey) into a “business 
of lying things out side by side”.13 Unsurprisingly, textuality is also law’s defining 
characteristic. Law revolves around acts and statutes, cases and court decisions, written 
and unwritten principles that are set up through language, and whose status and relevance 
are consistently determined by language. The ultimate aim of law’s textuality is precisely 
to ‘lie things out side by side’: to flatten out the complexity of reality and convert it into 
admissible legal facts, on the basis of which a decision can be taken. Textuality, therefore, 
is law’s main tool of representation. Reality is represented, indeed translated into, legal 
language. Acting on a need to eat despite having no money to buy food, is irrelevant to 
the law, unless translated into a legal event that would involve illegal possession through 
theft. Law does not deal with reality but with a legal representation of reality – it seems 
11
 Massey, For Space, p. 20
12
 Massey, For Space, p. 69
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that this is the only way in which the law can be meaningful. This means that the thief’s 
hunger might be considered in law as some form of extenuating circumstances – but they 
too would have to be translated into law, and would not alter the nature of the unlawful 
act.14
Textuality is part and parcel of what Massey critically refers to as the ‘negativity’ 
of deconstruction. As is well known, deconstruction took up structuralism’s linguistic 
structures and turn them onto their head through such interventions as différance, 
supplement, aporia and so on.15 Jacques Derrida’s phenomenological provenance, 
however, despite its undoubtedly revolutionary effect on contemporary thinking, is built 
around distinctions, fragmentations and ruptures, namely impasses that open negative 
spaces of impossibility. Of course, negativity in deconstruction is an inherently 
productive force; yet when contrasted (as Massey does) with something like the positivity 
of plenitude that comes from such thinkers as Spinoza, Nietzsche and Deleuze, 
deconstructivist negativity remains a space of impasse. For Massey, deconstructivist 
negativity takes otherness away from Derridean spacing. Massey, for whom otherness as 
inclusion of difference is paramount for space, links spacing with “rupture, dislocation, 
fragmentation and the co-constitution of identity/difference”.16 Massey’s critique of 
negativity as “both politically disabling and problematical for a rethinking of the 
14
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Human Rights?”, Journal of Law and Society 29(3) (2002), 379–405.
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 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. G. C. Spivak, (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1997).
16
 Massey, For Space, p. 51
spatial”17 would not sound alien if it were to be applied to law. To start with, law operates 
with a space of negativity in its conceptual core. This is because law is a paradox. It deals 
with lawfulness while relying axiomatically on its own presumed lawfulness. But is law 
lawful? This is the question the law should never ask because there is no possibility of 
external justification. Law is perforce ‘lawful’, immanently and axiomatically, because 
otherwise it could not justify its existence.18 At best, it draws its legitimacy from the 
exercise of ‘lawful’ (state) violence, of which it retains the monopoly.19 In other words, 
law must keep its foundations in the dark, in the negative space of blind-spots and 
foundational taboos, if it is to carry on. Negativity is part of law’s everyday operations 
too: it must distinguish between lawfulness and unlawfulness, indeed guilty and not 
guilty. Mark, not guilty and ‘innocent’.20 Neither outcome is characterized by positivity. 
At best, it is a question of minimizing negativity (‘not guilty’). Negativity characterizes 
law also socially: law is usually the last resort, the pit of negativity, when nothing else 
has worked or is expected to work.
Law operates through rupture and exclusion as a matter of course. One of the 
things that law ruptures and fragments is reality. The various narratives of the people who 
17
 Massey, For Space, p. 51
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 Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, trans. K Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004)
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come to or are called by the law, are submitted to a process of legal analysis and indeed 
fragmentation, excluding irrelevant facts and retaining only the ones that can be converted 
into legally ingestible bites. For this reason, law habitually excludes politics. This initially 
might appear counter-intuitive, but it is important to understand that law is not politics. 
What is law (and why it is not politics) follows immediately below, but the idea of 
exclusion of politics from law is an integral part of the legal identity. In a universally and 
equitably applied law, political biases are just that and must be avoided if the neutrality 
and objectivity of the law is to remain beyond reproach. Abstraction, textuality and 
representation, in a comparable way to their legal equivalents, are “characteristics which, 
to my mind at least, disable [space’s] full insertion into the political”.21 Law must remain 
apolitical if it is to retain (the allure of) objectivity. 
In so doing, however, law perpetuates its closure, namely its epistemically 
fortified boundaries that determine what law is, and how it differs from, say, politics or 
economics. A full discussion eschews the ambit of this article, but it is important to 
explain at least some elements of this legal closure. Following Niklas Luhmann’s 
analysis,22 which is arguably the most complete exposition of legal closure, the law is a 
normatively closed system, for which other disciplines/systems (such as politics, media, 
economics, religion and so on) have no relevance except if and when converted into legal 
language. For this to happen, a question must arise: is this event/act/object lawful or 
unlawful? Until then, nothing is registered by law. But once this question pops, law 
‘wakes up’ as it were, and begins its operations. Even then, however, law does not open 
up to other systems. It merely deals with issues that other systems might be dealing with 
21
 Massey, For Space, p. 17
22
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at the same time, from their own perspective and language. This is because each system 
in society has its own distinct function. Thus, law’s function is to bind the expectations 
that society has of what is and what is not lawful: in short, what to do and what to avoid. 
Expectations need to remain stable, and are not to be frivolously betrayed, if law is to 
remain relevant. Theft is to remain unlawful, whatever the circumstances. In this way, 
society will evolve, safe in the knowledge that property is protected by law. This means 
that, although the law changes, it does so incrementally and usually conservatively. This 
is also because legal change, just as any other legal operation, is a product of closure and 
not of direct influence from, say, politics or economics. If that were the case, then we 
would be talking about a totalitarian or corrupt society, where no separation of powers 
were in place. Let me take the example of an act of terrorism, an event that emerges in 
various systems with considerable force. It is taken up by the media, it is used by politics 
as a way of persuasion, it impacts global markets, it even reopens questions of religion if 
it was perpetrated by a religious fundamentalist. It is also taken up by law to assess 
whether indeed it was an act of terrorism, who the culprits were, and so on. There is cross-
fertilization among the various systems and their takes on the same act, but each system 
advances on its own temporality and according to its own function, and might well reach 
different outcomes (thus, the act might not have been legally speaking an act of terrorism, 
but the media’s take on it will have already created such a social panic that markets will 
have collapsed, and potentially catastrophic political decisions will have been taken in 
haste).
Both system and closure are anathema for Massey when it comes to space. System 
is understood in the ‘systematic’ way, as the superimposed structure that organizes space 
and movement in an orderly way thus trying to contain the inherent unpredictability of 
space. Likewise, “closure itself robs ‘the spatial’ (when it is called such) of one of its 
potentially disruptive characteristics: precisely its juxtaposition, its happenstance 
arrangement-in-relation-to-each-other, of previously unconnected 
narratives/temporalities; its openness of always being made.”23 It is fair to say that closure 
attracts Massey’s heftiest critique, largely because she understands closure (not 
unjustifiably) as something that fixes and coagulates (“space as always in process, as 
never a closed system” p 11), that keeps space locked up (“I hope to liberate ‘space’ from 
some chains of meaning (which embed it with closure and stasis…)” (p 19), and that 
formalizes things in ways that do not accord with life (“an order imposed upon the 
inherent life of the real” p 30). Closure is also associated with static synchronicity (p 38) 
and sealed causality (p 43), where “the closed system is the foundation for the singular 
universal” (p 55). Massey’s vituperative critique of closure is not out of place in the 
context of the references she uses. Spatial closure cuts off connections between places, 
while constructing a fake causal connectivity of all points included within, perpetuating 
in this way the colonial process of rejecting everything that does not fit the closed vision 
of the world. 
This list of theoretical constructions of space against which Massey writes could 
carry on. The point is not to offer an exhaustive list but to explore the potential parallels 
between these and some of the characteristics frequently attached to law, as I have shown 
above. The parallels are not accidental. Space and law are co-constituting, and so are 
theories about them. The omission to deal with the law has this remarkable effect: we are 
presented with the outcomes of the law’s presence in space, but not the causes. Ideas of 
space as representation, text, abstraction, system and closure, I argue, all come from a 
juridical understanding of space. Not only does law understand space in the above ways, 
23
 Massey, For Space, p. 39
but also, this specifically legal way of understanding space affects the way other 
disciplines understand space as well. To take it even further, law intervenes before the 
various theoretical constructions, and renders space a legal construction. This is because 
law has always already intervened, right from ‘the start’, when a line was drawn for the 
first time to distinguish ‘mine’ from ‘yours’. Law is ‘the first distinction’,24 a line carved 
on the ground with a twig, to show where the other should stop and where I should be 
able to feel free to roam. Which came first, whether law or line, is a matter of pedantry. 
They mutually reinforce each other, especially once, as Tim Ingold writes, lines were to 
be drawn with a ruler: 
“A ruler is a sovereign who controls and governs a territory. It is also an 
instrument for drawing straight lines. These two usages … are closely 
connected. In establishing the territory as his to control, the ruler lays 
down guidelines for its inhabitants to follow. And in his political 
judgements and strategic decisions – his rulings – he plots the course of 
action they should take. As in the territory so also on the page, the ruler 
has been employed in drawing lines of both kinds.” 25
Even before the use of the ruler, however, lines brought about the law of the land. In 
aboriginal spaces, law has always been synonymous with land and land with law.26 The 
24
 Luhmann, Law as a Social System.
25
 Tim Ingold, Lines: a Brief History (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 161.
26
 Christine Black, The Land is the Source of the Law: A Dialogic Encounter with 
Indigenous Jurisprudence (London: Routledge, 2011).
movement of bodies in space constructed the laws with which the body would move, 
marking space in a form that has always been co-extensive with law.
So why is there no law in Massey’s analysis of space? I would like to suggest that 
there is law but is hidden away. Law represents Massey’s fear that space is losing its 
political dimension and indeed its spatiality. In an instructive, parenthetical passage 
(instructive also because parenthetical) she writes: “(The effect of the application of 
‘rules’ is that, as with the assertion of the inevitability of globalisation, it takes politics 
out of the debate. It treats the process of globalisation as a technical matter)”.27 So ‘rules’ 
kill politics. ‘Rules’ are clustered together with ‘technical matter’ and, appearing later in 
the text, “the order of the market”.28 They are all, in some form, law, and they are all 
thought to have the same depoliticizing effect. Depoliticization of space is part of a larger, 
more serious movement that aims at taming space: “much ‘spatial politics’ is concerned 
with how such chaos can be ordered, how juxtapositions may be regulated, how space 
might be coded, how the terms of connectivity might be negotiated. Just as so many of 
our accustomed ways of imagining space have been attempts to tame it.”29 “Ordered”, 
“regulated”, “coded”, “negotiated”: one could hardly think of more deeply juridical verbs, 
all in the service of ‘taming’ space, making it flat, horizontal, synchronous, apolitical, in 
27
 Massey, For Space, p. 103
28
 Massey, For Space, p. 112
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 Massey, For Space, p. 152
short: aspatial.30 Space deprived of its fundamental characteristics of interrelations, 
multiplicity and process is no longer space.
Just as law fears space, as I have argued elsewhere,31 in the same way space fears 
law. Just as law despatializes space and makes it all law, space invalidates law and makes 
it all politics. Referring to public space, Massey writes: “all spaces are socially regulated 
in some way, if not by explicit rules (no ball games, no loitering) then by potentially more 
competitive (more market-like?) regulation which exists in the absence of explicit 
(collective? public? democratic? autocratic?) controls.”32 This admittance on the one 
hand of the all-pervading presence of regulation (even if qualified by the adverb 
‘socially’), and the total absence of analysis of the role of law on the other, can only mean 
one thing: that space is afraid of the law because of the latter’s potential despatializing 
effect through order, codes, rules and all the other known artifices of law. It reads, 
therefore, like denial when Massey gives Chapter 14 of For Space the title: “there are no 
rules of space and place”.33 Massey knows that there are rules everywhere, but she prefers 
to avoid this potential conflict between spatial politics and law. In a passage referring to 
the gaping disparity between the City of London and the rest of the city, she writes “it is 
a conflict which is usually hidden. Indeed the real difficulty is that lack of recognition.”34 
30
 see also Doreen Massey, Power-Geometries and the Politics of Space: Hettner Lecture 
1998 (Heidelberg: University of Heidelberg, 1999) on how globalization renders space 
aspatial.
31
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At the risk of sounding as if I am indulging sophistry, I would insist that conflict (which 
might emerge in politics but is regulated and ultimately resolved, if at all, by law) is not 
as pronounced in Massey’s work as it could be. Conflict appears only occasionally, 
usually when Massey discusses Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic politics.35 Conflict and its 
potential are not analyzed with the same rigor as other concepts, nor is it understood as 
anything more than political. But conflict is intimately connected to law. As a result, the 
role of the latter is marginalized. To put it differently, Massey demotes conflict and law 
from priorities, in her preference over a concept of space that emphasizes interrelations, 
multiplicity and process. This is a laudable attempt to reimagine space away from a 
Schmittian line drawn by a ruler and the ubiquity of nomic conflict, and towards space as 
emergence, relationality and open-endedness; but what is left outside is too important. 
Significantly, by marginalizing law, this approach leaves out a whole different 
understanding of space.
III. Another Law: the Lawscape
There is another law. This other law includes closure and text and even negativity. Yet, 
at the same time, it is folded in with space; it is intimately connected to matter, bodies 
and movement, often (but by no means always) converting this connection into textual 
representation; and it accepts negativity within a much ampler, positive plenitude. There 
is another law that functions along space, folding and unfolding while eavesdropping on 
35
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spatial operations. In what follows, I would like to suggest a way of thinking about law 
that is not removed from space, nor evokes the various negative geographical critiques in 
the way a more traditional understanding of the law would. This other law is not 
necessarily prohibitive, exclusionary or hierarchical (but it can also be that). Its intimate 
connection with space means that it is perfectly aware of its spatiality, and understands 
its operations to be stemming from and returning to it. 
This other law, I have called the lawscape.36 The lawscape is a way of thinking of 
the tautology between law and space. Lawscape is both another law, and another space. 
It is a response to the doctrinal, black-letter forms of law and legal thinking that habitually 
ignore spatial considerations; and a way of doing away with such preconceptions of law 
as abstract, universal, immaterial and incorporeal. It is also a response to geography that 
has found comfort in politics but has shied away from law. In other words, it is a way of 
sympathizing with and responding to Doreen Massey’s fears of law, not by allaying these 
fears but by suggesting another way of seeing the law. In this suggestion, however, there 
is something else too: in what follows, I show how fears of law cannot be easily separated 
from fears of space itself. That is, when there is fear of law, there is also fear of space. 
This fear refers to the possibilities, inherent in space, to become closed and negative, 
inescapably conflictual and given to technical, textual negotiations. In other words, to 
become ‘legalized’, asphyxiatingly settled and without the possibility of real positivity.37
I would like to suggest here that space can be all that stuff and yet remain 
spatialized and political. I further suggest that closure, textuality and negativity are even 
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necessary instances of space (and law). It is all a matter of degree: how much closure is 
enough? How much of a system must space be, in order to allow flow and future? How 
much textuality can space entertain without losing its positive accommodation of 
otherness? The degree of difference is determined by law. Law allows for a certain 
amount of closure, say in terms of locking up one’s own property door at night; or 
determining who will be able to cross one’s patch of land and under what conditions. But 
it also allows Hungary to shut off its boundaries to Syrian and other refugees, as it has 
happened in 2016-17. So what kind of closure and openness are we to accept and what to 
condemn? As Massey writes
“the real socio-political question concern less, perhaps, the degree of 
openness/closure…than the terms on which that openness/closure is 
established. Against what are boundaries erected? What are the relations 
within which the attempt to deny (and admit) entry is carried out? What 
are the power-geometries here; and do they demand a political 
response?”38
To this, I would add the demand for a legal response too, and legal negotiations during 
which the terms are established. The possibility of erecting boundaries is not always 
undesired – but when is the exclusion that inevitably results from boundaries excessive 
or plainly noxious and ethically reprehensible? This is a question of the lawscape, and the 
negotiations that take place in it. 
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I define the lawscape as the way the tautology between law and space unfolds as 
difference. We begin with tautology: for what is space without law or law without space? 
Space without law is a fantasy of pure possibility, some utopia where everything is settled 
because there is no difference, therefore no conflict. Space without law is a nullifying 
expanse where no body can ever move from its assigned position, because, if it did, it 
would create a distinction (indeed, a law) between before and after, here and there, 
movement and pause, indeed a way to do this, followed later by others until it becomes 
fixed as law. In the same vein, law without space is another fantasy of law as a universal, 
floating above spatial differences, obeying to some natural or theological necessity, but 
never really scooping down to apply itself to the situation in hand. So, law and space are 
folded into each other: they are co-emerging, co-constituting and co-evolving. 
We carry on with difference, the space of negotiations. For various epistemic and 
ontological reasons, the tautology often needs to be broken open. Epistemologically, as a 
means of focus that demands higher and more specialized detail, one excludes one or the 
other. Ontologically, more importantly, there is a need to take a distance from the sheer 
weight of the realization that law and space are tautological. We all need to forget about 
the law. We cannot be thinking about the law when we walk around a city, go for 
shopping, or switch on our TV to relax in the evening. We cannot be constantly thinking 
of ours and others’ legal obligations (by-laws, tort issues, contractual risks, environmental 
legal thresholds, EU law directives, international law obligations - despite their often 
having a direct impact on our everyday movements) when we are not, say involved in a 
legal case or contemplating legal action or being caught during a potentially illegal act. 
Space as interrelation and multiplicity requires the possibility of crossing boundaries. It 
also requires forgetting the fact that, in the act of crossing, one always generates new 
boundaries and therefore laws. Space (as difference, flow, process) requires an 
invisibilization of the law, if only temporarily.
Law also needs to invisibilize space. While permanently forgetting about space 
ends up in the usual time-and-history-led, ungrounded, incorporeal and immaterial 
accounts of law as abstract and universal, a temporary invisibilization of space for law 
can be useful. As mentioned earlier, law’s function is to bind social expectations that will 
not change arbitrarily or flippantly. Law needs to maintain the allure, even illusion, of 
stability despite temporal and geographical differences, because only in this way can the 
law nourish the narrative of its impartiality. This does not mean that law is not impartial. 
Nor, however, that it is. It might be, and it might not be impartial. The point is that law 
needs to retain its function as a final and neutral arbiter by maintaining also the narrative 
that goes with it – and to do this, law often needs to invisibilize space, make it less of a 
threatening factor to its universal appeal.
If, therefore, the lawscape is the way law and space unfold as difference, this 
unfolding takes place through invisibilization of either one of them, depending on the 
conditions. This invisibilization is not absolute. Rather, it is a matter of negotiations. Each 
body (human and nonhuman, individual and collective) that participates in the lawscape, 
negotiates its movement and the space generated, in relation to other bodies, and 
depending on the conditions, determines (not necessarily consciously) the degree of 
invisibilization of law or space. It is a body’s predicament to distance itself from either 
law or space, in order to facilitate its movement or pause (say, to choose to forget that a 
shopping mall is not just a consumerist heaven but also a place that excludes bodies that 
do not fit in, activities that interfere with shopping, climatological conditions that impede 
moving from shop to shop etc). Of course, there are bodies that are much stronger than 
others, making the whole movement skewed. This is where the law re-emerges in the 
lawscape and makes sure that, however much political power (in the body of an 
irresponsible head of state, multinational corporations, the local bully) wants to push 
things in a certain direction, the law will erect boundaries and resist. Not always of course, 
and not necessarily in a satisfactory way, but often with some measure of success.
There is always a degree of law in spatial narratives (and vice versa) as we have 
seen in Doreen Massey’s work. But it gets covered up, hidden under the guise of politics 
or generic notions of regulation. These are all degrees in which space invisibilizes law. 
As I have mentioned earlier, however, the degree of invisibilization in the case of 
Massey’s writing is indicative of a considerable fear towards law that is not merely about 
impermeable terminology but very specifically about a misunderstanding of what the law 
is (and I am referring here generally to geography, whose branch of legal geography is 
rather isolated and has not managed to capture the geographical imagination in the same 
way as, say, political geography has). 
Fearing law, however, is also fearing space – at least an aspect of space that 
relational theories marginalize.39 This is the aspect of space as closed, textual, negative 
and systematic. As I have shown above, while law is not just these things (there is another 
law), it is also these things, more than most other disciplines. The lawscape of co-
emergence of law and space can only mean one thing: not just law but also space can be 
closed, textual, negative and systemic. At the very least, it is the space within the ambits 
of traditional, black-letter law (namely, the way traditional law understands space) where 
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space is converted into jurisdiction, territory, property and so on. This means that space 
is never just smooth, to use the Deleuze/Guattarian terminology, but always 
simultaneously striated. This, Massey knows well, and indeed presents her project as a 
revolt against the by now stale geographical imagination of space “as already divided-up, 
of places which are already separated and bounded”.40 The main machine of striation, 
however, is law: fixing space and turning it into points, pillars of verticality, corridors of 
compulsion, tight measurements of distance and propinquity, normative geometries, lines 
of connection that do not allow any excess to surface. Space is unfolded by law, splayed 
like a canvas on which legal operations take place.41 Striation is logos, the Oedipal law, 
the law of the Father, law as rationality, enclosure, system and language.42 I am not 
suggesting that Massey is unaware of striation – quite the opposite. She is fully committed 
to fighting against it (just as she is ready to reject pure smoothness: “envisioning space 
as always-already territorialized, just as much as envisioning it as purely a sphere of 
flows, misunderstands the ever-changing ways in which flows and territories are 
conditions of each other”43) and her tools are precisely the relational multiplicity flows 
with which she has defined space. To define striation, however, merely based on the 
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political is not only to have a reductive understanding of striation, but significantly, to 
miss out on the legal tools that can help the political anti-hegemonic struggle.
The inclusion into the definition of the characteristics of space (and by 
implication, of law) that Massey rejects are important for two further reasons. First, 
systemic closure, textuality and even negativity are regularly generative of openness, 
materiality and positivity. Legal closure is a way for law to guarantee its independence 
from direct control by other, traditionally more visible or powerful forms of social 
expression, such as economics or politics. Spatial closure is a way of epistemologically 
and ontologically accessing space.44 Law’s textuality is a problem only when it excludes 
the material, the embodied and spatialised. But otherwise, it has managed to help law 
evolve in ways that otherwise would never have. Textuality of space and the discursive 
turn in the humanities as a whole, has in fact precipitated the spatial turn, setting the bases 
for an openness to otherness. Negativity, in the sense of discontinuity of legal and spatial 
flow, creates a space for pause (which is the necessary complement to flow, as Deleuze 
and Guattari have shown) but also of awareness of limits and limitations. Whether one 
places these characteristics in a positive or negative context, make a difference in how 
these are to be understood and dealt with. And in this, I wholeheartedly agree with 
Massey’s espousing of the Deleuzian/Bergsonian/Spinozan line of thought, that demands 
these to be placed on a plane of immanence where flows and pauses construct a manifold 
of plenitude rather than one of aporias. Yet, there is a significant place in the law/space 
thought productively occupied by such issues. 
The second reason for which these characteristics must be included when thinking 
of space, is that narratives of space are also part of spatial ontology, especially if one, like 
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Massey, wants to avoid essentialization and abstraction when defining space. Space ought 
to be understood ontologically as both the possibility of multiplicity, interrelations and 
process; and the equally present possibility of uniformity, formalization of relational 
paths, and pause. Narratives of space as bounded remain powerful in some disciplines, 
and not least in law. Regardless of whether these are right or wrong, they are necessary 
ruptures of the open space of flows. We cannot underestimate the latter’s unnerving 
expanse. To be out, in the open space of flow, is also to be exposed to individual and 
social vulnerability.45 A way of dealing with that is to erect walls, put up barriers, hide 
behind walls and locked doors, create spaces of pause. When defining space, we need to 
be aware of these needs and not to dismiss them as neoliberal, bourgeois comforts. I 
remember walking in Kilburn with Doreen, when a cyclist who was cycling on the 
pavement passed us by. He was not going fast or aggressively, and he seemed to know 
that he was doing something not quite right. Yet, at that moment, Massey of flows became 
Doreen of boundaries: she scolded him for cycling on the pavement. After my initial 
surprise, I understood: her reaction was indicative, beyond any doubt, of hers and 
everyone’s need for a space where (traffic) flow is not desired. Doreen at that point called 
upon law (clearly on her side) to help her contain the narrative of the cyclist. She opted 
for pausing rather than flowing along. These days, whenever I cycle on the pavement (but 
mind: because it would be unsafe otherwise, and always carefully, hesitantly and ceding 
priority to the pedestrian!), Doreen is there to caution me. 
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IV. Responsibility and Justice
In this section, I would like to touch upon two intimately juridical concepts, those 
of responsibility and justice, which are explicitly (in the first case) and implicitly (in the 
case of justice) addressed by Massey. The reason I find these concepts compelling is 
because they allow a greater integration between law and space, if one is willing to 
interpret them in the spatiolegal manner I attempt below.  
Massey often writes about responsibility. Her political geography project has 
come to full fruition early on with her influential piece on power-geometries,46 where 
responsibility referred mostly to the way we should be imagining a new kind of space, 
beyond representation, closure and stasis. Responsibility was the center of her 2004 piece 
Geographies of Responsibility, the main arguments of which were then expanded in For 
Space. Massey is influenced by Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd’s Spinozan take on 
responsibility,47 with which she agrees on at least three points: 
“First, this is a responsibility which is relational: it depends on a notion of 
the entity (individual, political group, place) being constructed in relation 
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is said to be embodied. And third, this is a responsibility which implies 
extension: it is not restricted to the immediate or the very local.”48 
Although Gatens and Lloyd’s emphasis is on time, Massey attempts to spatialize their 
thinking by linking it to distance: “Responsibility takes the form of a nested set of Russian 
dolls. First there is 'home', then perhaps place or locality, then nation, and so on. There is 
a kind of accepted understanding that we care first for, and have our first responsibilities 
towards, those nearest in.”49 But extension, embodiment and relationality, in sum space, 
make connections much more complicated than simple circles of intimacy and 
strangeness. Massey uses London as a prime example of connectivity, which tends to 
prioritize the global (financially speaking) over the local. 
On a spatial level, responsibility refers to the way we position ourselves (indeed, 
our bodies) in relation to other bodies. Responsibility is typically a juridical term.50 On a 
spatiolegal level, it is one of the main lawscape mechanisms for negotiating law and 
space. I understand responsibility as the corporeal ‘response’ to a noxious, ethically 
questionable body (a body is always collective, always an assemblage, even when 
belonging to one individual51). It is a body’s responsibility to move away from a 
problematic assemblage, and further, proactively to stop this from carrying on. In this I 
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am inspired by Jane Bennett’s description of responsibility,52 but also from the legal 
understanding of responsibility that refers to both positive and negative obligations (in 
the sense of omission of a duty to act, say, when a life is in danger). In that sense, not 
only do we, as humans, have a responsibility to remove ourselves from noxious 
assemblages that perpetuate, say, environmental degradation, climate change denial, and 
rampant exploitation, but the responsibility extends to oppose to this and actively trying 
to stop such regimes. Massey’s context of interrelations is very significant here: beyond 
Russian dolls, we are now faced with a planetary responsibility and indeed need to care. 
Our presence on the planet has made us all part of a noxious assemblage – the 
Anthropocene. Temporally and spatially, the new geology of the Anthropocene that 
describes the human as ever-present through their acts and their consequences, has 
brought an urgent sense of spatialised responsibility: the need to relate to the planet. 
Responsibility in this case is actualized through the withdrawal from assemblages that 
contribute to the planetary decline. There is, of course, the major issue of historical 
responsibility, as Gatens and Lloyd remind us. The difficulty of situating oneself 
responsibly in relation to a past that determines present and future cannot be 
underestimated.53 The answer lies in the possibility of redescribing things in a way that 
neither absolves a body from the responsibility of situating itself, nor inebriates this 
(human) body with the illusion of control of the assemblage, or indeed the whole world. 
The question now becomes how to take advantage of the human omnipresence and not 
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be fooled by the superficial impression that to be everywhere equates to being central to 
everything.54
This is emphatically not a neoliberal discourse. It is not about one’s individual, or 
even collective freedom to withdraw freely and to decide one’s own fate. If there is 
freedom in it, it is a Spinozan freedom, namely the necessity of self-actualization of each 
body, rather than an expression of free will. Every body is part of a greater, collective 
body. Freedom in that sense, is the actualization of one’s situatedness within that body. 
This is a distinctly collective freedom55 that operates as the enabling bondage of the 
responsibility of being situated with regards to other bodies. This is a distinctly spatial 
responsibility that requires specific corporeal spatial movements, material action and 
embodied decisions. Finally, this is a distinctly juridical responsibility in that it 
presupposes negotiations but necessarily ends up in clear-cut distinctions of the binary, 
almost side-taking type. Political responsibility is often thought of in parallel to morality. 
A juridical responsibility, however, does not have an overarching moral structure to 
appeal to and be determined by. Rather, it is ethical in the Spinozan way, namely localized 
and particular, always in process, necessarily unfolding in relation to other bodies; but 
also aware of the need to remain faithful to the function of binding expectations and not 
letting society down. 
Massey’s work encourages us to think of the spatiality of juridical responsibility 
as part of a larger conceptual framework – one with which Massey has not dealt explicitly, 
but which characterizes her work as a whole. This is the concept of justice, and spatial 
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justice in particular. It is beyond doubt that Massey was preoccupied by the lack of justice, 
not merely in the distributive sense, but in a profoundly embodied and grounded sense. 
Her work on gender and space for example,56 attests amply to the need for a just 
understanding of gender difference and the challenges that women (still) face on the 
frontline between the private and the public. Or indeed the spatial injustice analyzed by 
The Kilburn Manifesto,57 where the local was already competing with the global – and 
losing. 
The idea of justice as a just emplacement, namely a connection with other bodies, 
simultaneously and relationally, and the continuous negotiation of one’s position, is 
paramount to Massey’s work. One of her favorite examples has been the disparity 
between North and South England: anger about injustice was oozing through her every 
pore when she was talking about how the North has been essentially left to its own 
devices. Always in the North, but this time in the greater Manchester area, where Doreen 
Massey grew up and later used to visit her aging parents, the most tangible instance of 
spatial justice emerges in the way her father and mother were increasingly pushed out of 
their city by other bodies, busy and faster and threatening. This she describes as the 
destiny of space, “quite ordinary spaces [that] hold up a mirror which excludes you from 
membership.”58 In a brief but infinitely endearing text, Doreen talks about the various 
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bodies, human and nonhuman, that vie for the same space: affluent residents, council 
tenants, new council housing owners, her parents; but also airplanes that fly above, buses, 
garden city ideologies, protective grills against vandalism and burglary, even “trees [that] 
will outlast us all”.59 Amongst this parade of bodies, there is a familiar one: the cyclist 
who cycles on the pavement. 
“Young lads on bikes can terrify the life out of you. My father has devised a spatial 
tactic: he never walks in the middle of the pavement but always to one side (the 
inside edge is best) – that way you know which side of you the bikes will go.”60
This is the definition of spatial justice I would like to suggest: spatial justice is a question 
that emerges when two or more bodies desire to occupy the same space at the same time.61 
Doreen’s father and the ubiquitous cyclist vie for the same space at the same time. Is there 
any point of confronting a cyclist with your own frail, aged body? What are your options? 
Appeal to the law, of course. Point to the boundaries given to you by law: cycling on the 
pavement is illegal. A cyclist is a collective, technological, distinctly posthuman body, 
much stronger than that of an aged gentleman. The encounter is fractally repeated on 
various different lawscaping levels: gentrification versus existing working-class 
residents; air pollution versus planetary health; fish stock versus industrial fishing fleets. 
The list goes on, and the register often needs to change in order for an ethical solution to 
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be found. Existing registers, say, money-making versus environmental considerations, or 
relocation versus better amenities, are not always helpful since they are often co-opted 
and the answers prescribed. The solution is often to withdraw from the register of the 
particular confrontation. In the cyclist’s case, the gentleman withdrew from the register 
of the confrontation and found a spatial path that would allow him to share that space. 
Withdrawal is neither passive, nor a defeat. It is a different plane of negotiation, a re-
oriented lawscape where bodies can be creative about opportunities for new spatial and 
corporeal configurations: “as the built environment shifts to respond to other desires, the 
consequent exclusions may themselves be identity-forming: they, too, are part of what 
tells you who you are.”62 
Just as spatial justice cannot be thought of as a closed, static affair where each 
body finds its perfect emplacement for eternity, in the same way it cannot be thought of 
as nostalgia, return to the origin, or indeed return to a land claim just because one 
happened to get there first. Massey is aware of this, and the message is given to us through 
a cake anecdote. During a visit home, Doreen and her sister were bitterly disappointed 
when their mother presented them, not with the tried, tested and expected, much loved 
chocolate cake, but a new recipe, all light and fluffy and not at all like the stodgy, war-
time blend they were used to. “But with one voice my sister and I sent up a wail of 
complaint – ‘Oh Mum…but we like the old chocolate cake.’”63 Doreen lived to regret 
that reaction, but the incident became a valuable lesson: “when nostalgia articulates space 
and time in such a way that it robs others of their histories (their stories), then indeed we 
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need to rework nostalgia.”64 This is also a question of justice: claims that vie with the 
claims of others (through narratives but also official historical accounts) by claiming the 
same space in exclusion of all others, are not the way to go. We need to withdraw from 
such strategies.
Massey’s distance from law is much more pronounced than her distance from 
justice. Even though she hardly ever addresses issues of justice explicitly, justice and 
specifically spatial justice underlines her work. But spatial justice is the spatiolegal, 
indeed lawscaping, concept par excellence, and as such, an entry point for Massey’s 
difficult connection with law, and a smoother, kinder, easier connection with justice.
V. Law after space/Space after law
Considering law an integral, indeed unavoidable part of spatial thinking has profound 
consequences for both law and space. Let me offer some basic pointers of how this space 
opened by the lawscape, as the tautology and simultaneous difference between law and 
space, can be understood. 
First, space should necessarily be described as both open and closed because of 
the various legal instruments that allow or enforce closure. While space can still be 
imagined as open (and indeed it must) as Massey urges us, its factual legal closure must 
be taken into consideration when constructing spatial strategies. 
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Second, and a consequence of the first, law (and its characteristics as closed, 
textual, negative and so on) helps explain why space is, both in concept and fact, 
closed/textual/negative and so on. Except for offering the reason (such as property, 
community, national jurisdiction etc, in the service of binding expectations) for these 
spatial formations, law also offers a social understanding of why these formations might 
be deemed necessary or even desirable. This is not a justification of property regimes, 
community nostalgia or geopolitical exclusions. On the contrary, it is a suggestion for an 
integrated understanding of the polymorphy of space as a means of further changing it, 
according to the desires of the bodies that constitute it. 
Third, law allows a deeper understanding of the power of structures that emerge 
when bodies move in and with space, generating different spaces and laws as they go 
along. Issues of path dependency (or legal precedent and social expectations of law), 
desire for protection (and therefore exclusion of others) to the point of security-obsessed65 
and immunized66 societies, are intimately connected to a legal understanding of territory 
and one’s perceived rights to it.
Differentiating law from politics in terms of space is also important, not least 
because of their different temporalities. Political action can be swifter and more 
immediate, indeed more rousing. But its significance will be much reduced if legal 
solidification in the form of legal amendments is not introduced. In order for the latter to 
take place, a longer, more ponderous temporality (that of law) needs to be taken into 
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consideration, with time lags of uncertainty that may have, in turn, a political effect. All 
this is mirrored on, or more accurately co-constituted with, space. The spatial jurisdiction 
of administrative units, for example, changes across time, not just in terms of political 
will but, more regularly, as a ‘quiet’ legal change. This is important also for the way local 
communities are structured following changes in the law, which pass without political 
consent, serious consultation or struggle, and yet have a profound political effect on the 
spatiality of neighborhoods.
Introducing law into space brings forth the element of conflict in a more 
pronounced way. Conflict is more than multiplicity and interrelations. It can be much 
more expansive and determining, and can overshadow precisely the multiplicity that has 
enabled it to emerge in the first place. Understanding the role of law in the spatiality of 
conflict has a double effect: on the one hand, to fathom how political conflict can be 
filtered and possibly quelled through legal intervention; on the other, to understand 
epistemological ruptures in terms of narratives of belonging, and to offer the tools for a 
more sober albeit admittedly often inadequate dealing (such as the position of 
international law with regards to the Israeli settlements in the West Bank).
In turn, thought together with space, law integrates its spatiotemporal 
groundedness and moderates the reach of its universal and abstract narrative. Law’s 
spatiality fleshes out law’s relationality, moving away from traditional legal 
anthropocentrism, and bringing in posthuman considerations that normally escape law’s 
theoretical grasp. At the same time, spatial emplacement with regards to issues of 
responsibility and justice becomes an opportunity for law to examine its monopoly of 
violence, social oppression potential, and such latent (or even overt) structures as racism, 
sexism and other forms of discrimination that contribute to an impression of legal 
neutrality even when faced with issues of structural bias, historical and current colonial 
configurations, and systematic violence. In other words, as I have commented 
elsewhere,67 space brings in law ethical considerations that demand in their turn ethical 
positioning on behalf of law.
Doreen Massey has launched a new way of thinking about space. Most 
importantly, however, she has offered a new way of thinking about ourselves (in our 
posthuman, embodied collectivities) in relation to that space. Her deeply political project 
is visionary yet grounded, highly theoretical yet steeped into her everyday experience. 
What I have tried to do here is amplify this everyday experience, open up that spatial 
manifold and reveal law-related aspects of space that, in her visionary, optimistic and 
future-arresting flight, Doreen had put aside. While it is important to remain optimistic 
and carry on this flight of politics and space that Massey has begun, it is also important 
to acknowledge the various legal ways in which optimism gets clipped by law, and at the 
same time, to have ready the legal tools to carry this optimistic transformation.
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